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I.

INTRODUCTION

S Benjamin R. Civiletti stated while Attorney General:
The manner in which federal prosecutors exercise their
decision-making authority has far-reaching implications,
both in terms ofjustice and effectiveness in law enforcement and in terms of the consequences for individual citizens. A determination to prosecute . . . recognize[es]

both that serious violations of federal law must be prosecuted, and that prosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the accused
whether or not a conviction ultimately results.'
It is impossible to disagree with this perception by the Department ofJustice. First, it is generally recognized that although

civil enforcement actions by the government can have serious
consequences, including monetary penalties; the consequences of
a criminal prosecution or investigation are even more significant,
including substantial monetary penalties, the possibility of hard
jail time, and a recognized "stigma of criminality."
Moreover, it is not unusual for an environmental criminal defendant to incur several hundred thousand dollars in attorneys'
fees if a case goes to trial. Indeed, it is because of the potency of
criminal charges that regulators increasingly view criminal enforcement as a preeminent deterrent to serious environmental
1. "The Principles of Federal Prosecution," a statement of the Justice Department's general approach to criminal prosecution, appeared in a former version of the United States Attorneys' Manual, but this excerpt was deleted from
the revised manual released in 1989. See THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL
§ 001, 9-499 (Prentice Hall ed. Supp. 1990-92) [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
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violations. 2
Second, the recognition of former Attorney General Civiletti
that "[t]he manner in which federal prosecutors exercise their decision-making authority has far-reaching implications" cannot be
disputed. 3 This conclusion, in fact, leads to periodic efforts on
the part of law enforcement officials, judges, and panels establishing sentencing guidelines, to seek uniform penalties for comparable crimes. 4 Similarly, the establishment of federal sentencing
guidelines seeks to assure national uniformity in penalties (i.e., defendants found guilty of similar crimes in California and Maine
will be punished similarly).
However, criminal enforcement of environmental law is a relatively new and vigorously evolving practice. There are, accordingly, few established standards for determining which
environmental violations rise to the level of criminality and who
within the governmental enforcement hierarchy makes that determination. 5 There is also little assurance of centralized supervi2. See, e.g., E. Dennis Muchnicki, Only Criminal Sanctions Can Ensure Public
Safety, 7 ENVTL. FORUM 31 (May/June 1990).
Moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Commission setting guidelines for environmental criminal offenses noted that "[t]he Commission was also aware that Congress has expressed views in favor of tougher penalties for white collar offenses,
a category that includes many environmental offenders. Environmental offenses
can - and quite often do - pose a threat to society that far outweighs their
numbers." Address by the Honorable William A. Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Commission, National Conference on Local and State Enforcement of
the Environmental Laws (Mar. 30, 1989).
3. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, rev. ed. 1988 at 2 (stating goal of ensuring proportionality in sentencing between defendants guilty of similar conduct).
5. The standards for criminal environmental violations can be surprisingly
low. Under the Clean Water Act, mere negligent violation can be sufficient. See
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1987). Thus, as a technical matter, a company discharging
in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Clean Water Act may be held criminally responsible. Id. If there
is a pattern of violation of minor permit parameters, even a knowing violation
might be established. Id. at 3. Giving substantive content to imprecise statutory
standards like this is a pressing and difficult project for the EPA and the Department of Justice. In addition, certain presumptions water down the knowledge
element that the government typically must show to prove a felony offense
under an environmental statute, easing the government's evidentiary burden.
See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (in prosecutions under public welfare statutes, proof of knowledge of legal offense not required); United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (under "responsible corporate officer theory," officers with authority over area of violation can be held criminally liable
under health and safety laws without proof of intent to commit violative act). See
generally infra notes 7-36 and accompanying text.
James N. Strock, until recently EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, has acknowledged the difficulties in enforcing complicated regulatory re-
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sion over local prosecutions by United States Attorneys' offices in
the fifty states, which may be influenced by local political agendas.
Also, regional offices frequently lack expertise in environmental
criminal law, and generally are without knowledge of, or appreciation for, well-established civil and administrative prosecution
options for environmental violations. 6
In sum, there are inadequate mechanisms for encouraging
uniform application of environmental criminal law across the
country. Indeed, whether a violation is treated criminally, civilly
or administratively is more a function of what type of investigator
learns of the violation first and in what judicial district the violation occurs, not the nature or environmental severity of the
violation.
This article first considers the Justice Department's centralized review procedures for civil environmental enforcement actions, whether proposed by regulatory agencies, U.S. Attorneys,
or the Justice Department itself, and examines the contrasting
lack of such oversight of criminal environmental prosecutions, as
well as a possible model for such oversight. We note at the same
time that the complex issue of centralized review of proposed
criminal environmental prosecutions has been the subject of
long-standing debate at the Department of Justice.
Second, this article considers the culpability requirements in
environmental crimes. The statutory and judicial definition of
"knowing" is discussed in detail because the majority of the environmental statutes require a "knowing" violation. Given the serious nature of the crimes and the penalties involved, the
complexity of the laws, and the broad applicability of the federal
environmental laws to American society; a higher level of culpability should be imposed, either as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or through statutory amendment. This higher standard
would establish a bright line between those environmental violations that are criminal and those that are civil and administrative,
quirements. Strock Says EPA Enforcement Focus Shifts. .. , 5 Toxics L. REP. (BNA)
770, 771 (Nov. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Strock Statement]. The lack of standards
and the trend toward criminalizing environmental violations is discussed in
greater detail in Kevin A. Gaynor, A System Spinning Out of Control, 7 ENVTL. FoRUM 28 (May/June 1990). See also Judson W. Starr, Too Many Cooks..., 6 ENVTL.
FORUM 9 (Jan./Feb. 1989).
6. Meanwhile, as noted by former EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement Strock, "[w]here a regulation becomes tremendously complex or ambiguous to a person of reasonable intelligence, it is hard to comply with ....
If it is
hard to comply with it is hard to enforce." Strock Statement, supra note 5 at 771.
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thereby guiding prosecutors and establishing standards of conduct that the public can understand.
II.

THE CASE FOR CENTRALIZED REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL ACTIONS

A.

Uniform National Enforcement of Civil Environmental
Laws

It is generally recognized that compliance requirements
under environmental laws are complex and technical and growing
more so by the day. EPA's regulations alone, without explanatory
preambles and agency guidance, total over 10,000 pages in the
Code of Federal Regulations and are constantly changing. The
regulatory scheme is so complex that environmental regulators,
consultants, and lawyers necessarily specialize in discrete facets of
the regulations. Consistent with recognition of this complexity,
the Justice Department has, in cooperation with EPA, established
procedures to review and assess the appropriateness of proposed
enforcement actions involving civil environmental violations.
The Environmental Enforcement Section of the Justice Department's Environment and Natural Resources Division (Enforcement Section) has Departmental responsibility for civil
matters initiated on behalf of the United States to secure control
and abatement of environmental pollution. 7 In the case of civil
enforcement referrals by EPA - the primary source of enforcement cases - normal procedure involves compilation of a referral package by an EPA attorney, followed by internal EPA review
according to established procedures.8 After EPA approval of the
referral package, it is forwarded to the Enforcement Section,
where it is carefully reviewed by a trial attorney and his supervisors, including the chief or deputy chief of the Section. 9 An approval memorandum compiled by the Section based on the EPA
referral, together with the related complaint, are then presented
for formal approval by the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment, who must sign the complaint before it can be filed.' 0
With limited exceptions, all enforcement cases arising under
the environmental statutes entrusted to the Enforcement Section
require the prior review and approval of the Assistant Attorney
7. See DOJ MANUAL 5-12.111 at 5-98.
8. See Kevin A. Gaynor, Too Many Cooks ...
1989).
9. DOJ MANUAL 5-12.111 at 5-98.
10. Id.

,

6

ENVrL. FORUM 9, 10
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General before they can be filed." l Only a limited category of
cases may be handled by U.S. Attorneys as direct referrals without
specific authorization: (1) cases referred by the Coast Guard for
collection of cleanup costs or civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act; or (2) miscellaneous proceedings, such as warrants, in
aid of agencies seeking investigative entry under environmental
statutes. 2 For example, where a case has been directly referred
to a U.S. Attorney by a regulatory agency or an FBI agent, the
U.S. Attorney is required to notify and keep the Section informed
of the proceeding.' 3 Even where circumstances present a need
for swift enforcement, U.S. Attorneys are directed to contact the
chief of the Enforcement Section.14
The centralized review procedures under which civil environmental enforcement cases are brought may not guarantee, but
can help to ensure both that the cases that are pursued by the
government meet minimum standards and that national precedents resulting from local enforcement actions will be good
precedents for the government.' 5 At the same time, this review
process helps to ensure uniform application of the law on a national basis, the original impetus for a comprehensive environ6
mental regulatory structure.'
B.

Limited Justice Department Oversight of Environmental
Criminal Enforcement

By contrast, in the case of criminal enforcement of environmental laws, the Justice Department has established no approval
process like that established in the civil environmental arena. Justice Department procedures acknowledge that certain environ11. See DOJ MANUAL 5-12.320.A. at 5-102.
12. Id.
13. See DOJ MANUAL 5-12.321 at 5-102.
14. Likewise, in the case of civil enforcement of wetlands law, which is entrusted to the Environmental Defense Section of the Environment Division, U.S.
Attorneys are authorized to act upon direct referrals generally only in cases of a
routine nature involving settled interpretations of statutes. Such enforcement
by U.S. Attorneys is subject to the supervision of the Defense Section. See DOJ
MANUAL 5-6.310 at 5-45; 5-6.311 at 5-45.
15. Of course, despite the existence of centralized review procedures in the
civil environmental area, U.S. Attorneys have on a rare occasion chosen to proceed with a case notwithstanding Main Justice's decision against such proceedings. However, what is rare in the civil context is arguably the rule in the
criminal area.
16. See, e.g., legislative history for 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments ("the
basic strategies in the Nation's war against air pollution must be developed in a
unified and consistent way by the Federal Government..."), H.R. REP. No.
1146, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5371.
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mental crimes cases, although subject to the ultimate authority of
the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment, may be handled entirely by U.S. Attorneys, with no consultation of the Environmental Crimes Section. 17 The procedures recognize that
other environmental cases may be developed and referred by regulatory agency personnel to FBI agents who work with U.S. Attorneys or by regulatory agency personnel referring matters directly
to U.S. Attorneys' offices. 18 For such cases, the Crimes Section
procedures provide that the Section's expertise is available to the
U.S. Attorneys' offices if they choose to use it.
U.S. Attorneys are authorized to commence prosecution of
any matter arising under enumerated environmental statutes,
provided that notification of the decision to prosecute is given to
the Environmental Crimes Section.' 9 U.S. Attorneys also retain
authority to prosecute cases under environmental statutes which
are not developed or referred to them by a federal agency, subject
to notification of the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment Division. 20 Pursuant to this authority, cases can be brought
without any involvement of EPA or any other federal regulatory
agency, in contrast to the formal referral process found in the civil
2
enforcement procedures. I
U.S. Attorneys are notably unsupervised in initiating criminal
environmental investigations. Although the Manual "encourages" U.S. Attorneys to contact the Crimes Section to take advantage of the Section's expertise in drafting affidavits for warrant
applications and grand jury subpoenas, nothing compels them to
do so. 2 2 Meanwhile, these elements of an investigation are in
themselves potentially more invasive than a discreet inquiry by an
investigator, and an investigation brings with it a stigma that can
significantly affect morale in the workplace.
Thus, the Environmental Crimes Section frequently has the
role of a bystander, while the prosecution is carried on by the U.S.
Attorney. Under the relatively laissez-faire framework established
by the Department for oversight of environmental criminal prosecutions, there is nothing to prevent the U.S. Attorneys from in17. See DOJ MANUAL 5-11.110.C at 5-84.
18. See DOJ MANUAL 5-11.301 at 5-85.
19. See DOJ MANUAL 5-11.304 at 5-89.
20. DOJ MANUAL 5-11.306 at 5-88.
21. For example, some Assistant U.S. Attorneys receive cases from state
investigators desiring to avoid their bureaucracy or from FBI agents, working
without EPA oversight or involvement.

22. DOJ

MANUAL

5-12.612 at 5-107.
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vestigating, issuing subpoenas, convening grand juries, and
initiating prosecutions without consultation with the Justice
23
Department.
This arrangement is far different from the enforcement established for civil violations of environmental laws, yet governs an
area - criminal enforcement - in which the need for uniform
application of the law is often much higher, given the enormous
impact a criminal investigation has on individuals and companies.
The reason for the substantially different supervisory authority of
the Enforcement and Crimes Sections is not clear, but is certainly
not justified by the difference in expertise of U.S. Attorneys compared with the Crimes Section. Environmental law is notoriously
technical and complex and few U.S. Attorneys or Assistant U.S.
Attorneys have extensive expertise in this area. None have resources akin to those of the Environmental Crimes Section, and,
most importantly, none have the vantage point of the Crimes Section to assure consistent application of the law on a national basis.
Further, although U.S. Attorneys have traditionally undertaken local prosecution of certain federal criminal statutes 24 the
standards of liability, evidence, and proof under such statutes are
often long-established and well understood. Environmental law,
by contrast, is continually evolving through rulemaking and litigation that results in new interpretations of these laws. Moreover,
the detailed centralized approval procedures established in the
23. In fact, the Department of Justice has not established standards by
which federal prosecutors should decide whether or not to even bring a criminal
case or how to assess the strength of such a case. For example, federal prosecutors have been "encouraged" by the Department ofJustice to consider an environmental offender's audit program and voluntary disclosure of violations when
contemplating criminal prosecution and in assessing the need for leniency. See
U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental and Natural Resources Division
Memorandum from Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General to all United
States Attorneys, regarding Exercise of Criminal ProsecutorialDiscretionfor Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by
the Violator, June 3, 1991.
This guidance sets forth factors to be considered in assessing the strength
of the criminal case, such as cooperation with the government, voluntary disclosure, and compliance programs. It provides examples of situations whereby the
presence of certain criteria might suggest leniency. However, DOJ falls short of
actually setting standards for criminal prosecution and reassures prosecutors
that prosecutional discretion still prevails.
24. But see, e.g., discussion infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (regarding criminal tax prosecutions). See also DOJ MANUAL 7-5.000 - 7-5.628 (Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust Division must authorize U.S. Attorney investigation, grand jury proceedings and indictments based on violations of antitrust
laws); DOJ MANUAL 9-2.132 (criminal prosecutions relating to national security
may not be instituted without express authority of Criminal Division).
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case of environmental civil enforcement indicates a recognized interest in uniform federal enforcement of the environmental laws.
However, such uniform enforcement would seem even more important in the case of potentially more invasive and threatening
criminal prosecutions in the environmental area.
At the same time, Justice Department procedures to ensure
uniform application of criminal environmental laws are clearly
feasible. The Justice Department has established centralized procedures for criminal enforcement of the tax laws, indicating that
such procedures do not unreasonably restrict enforcement of tax
laws, but serve an important countervailing public interest: the
uniform national application of tax requirements so that a taxpayer living in Maine is treated no differently from one living in
California for a particular violation, resulting in the fair applica25
tion of these laws.
Like tax laws, environmental laws present a pervasive statutory scheme affecting many Americans, and this number grows
yearly as the trend towards stricter and more broadly applicable
requirements continues. Not only are persons being more heavily
regulated in their business activities, but non-business activities
are increasingly being regulated also. For example, the new
Clean Air Act Amendments are likely to generate requirements
covering such things as automobile usage and use of lighter fluid
for outdoor grills.
C.

A Model for Uniform National Standards for Criminal
Prosecution: Criminal Enforcement of Federal Tax
Laws

Guiding criminal enforcement by the Justice Department's
Tax Division is the objective of obtaining "maximum deterrent
value from the cases prosecuted." 26 The Justice Department recognizes that "[t]o achieve this objective, the government's tax enforcement activities must reflect uniform enforcement of the tax
laws."

27

Thus, with limited exceptions, all basic prosecutorial functions are subject to the prior approval of theJustice Department's
Tax Division. 28 These functions include investigations, empaneling of grand juries, filing of bills of information or returning in25. DOJ

MANUAL

6-4.010 at 6-25.

MANUAL

6-4.211 at 6-34.

26. Id.
27. Id.

28. DOJ
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dictments, and otherwise initiating prosecutions.2 9 In the normal
course, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has concluded
an administrative investigation, a report detailing the investigation and its results, approved by the IRS district counsel, is for30
warded to the Tax Division for review and authorization.
Moreover, U.S. Attorneys are required to obtain prior Tax Division authorization before initiating grand jury inquiries into possible violations of the criminal tax laws and expanding a grand
jury investigation to include targets not previously authorized by
the Tax Division. 3 ' Further, recommendations for prosecution
based on grand jury investigations pursued with Tax Division authority by a U.S. Attorney must be submitted to the Tax Division
for authorization.3 2 Generally, even search warrants must be authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for Tax. 33 Moreover,
in any case in which U.S. Attorney's offices have been authorized
to pursue prosecutions, the Tax Division monitors all matters as34
sociated with that case.
These centralized review procedures are established to ensure uniform application of the criminal tax laws. At the same
time, these elaborate review procedures are evidently consistent
with the Tax Division's stated goal of achieving maximum possible deterrence. 35 Thus, centralized review both addresses the
need for uniform application of criminal environmental law and
serves the goal of effective deterrence.
D.

Conclusion

The concern discussed here for centralized oversight of environmental criminal prosecutions is not merely academic. Such
prosecutions are on the increase, and the public mood currently
favors imposition of the severe penalties mandated by the U.S.
29. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL 6-4.120, .122, .123, .127.
30. DOJ MANUAL 6-4.127 at 6-32. The centralized procedures followed by
the IRS may facilitate central Justice Department review better than the case
referral process in place in EPA regional offices.
31. DOJ MANUAL 6-4.120, .123.

32. DOJ

MANUAL

6-4.120 at 6-28.

33. DOJ MANUAL 6-4.130 at 6-33. Significantly, EPA itself is currently moving toward more centralized control of enforcement activities. Strock Statement,
supra note 5 at 770. EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement Strock noted
that part of the role of the EPA Headquarters Office of Enforcement was to
"ensure that regional actions conform to national EPA priorities." Id. However,
EPA has little control over the activities of FBI agents or Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.
34. DOJ MANUAL 6-4.213.C.
35. DOJ MANUAL 6-4.010 at 6-25.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/1

10

Gaynor et al.: Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes for a Flawed Sy

19921

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Sentencing Commission guidelines, which apply to violations occurring since November 1987.36 However, even the staunchest

advocate of criminal enforcement of the environmental laws can
have no principled objection to a policy that might encourage
uniform enforcement of environmental laws clearly national in
application. Uniform enforcement is fully consistent with the
prosecutor's interest in deterrence, and will more likely be recognized as fair by the regulated community.
III.

CULPABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL

CRIMES

Exacerbating the lack of centralized review of environmental
criminal cases is the minimal level of culpability required for a
case to become a criminal case. As discussed below, a citizen can
be convicted for a felony under the typical environmental statute
by displaying a level of mens rea that is a watered-down version of
general intent, which results in the government needing to show
little to establish the knowledge element under these statutes.
Further, some of these statutes require the government to show
only negligence to establish criminal liability. Because the threshold standard is so low, whether a violation is treated criminally,
civilly or administratively is not necessarily made through the
principled and predictable application of the statutory scheme,
but rather, can be made on the whim of an Assistant U.S. Attorney. As a consequence, virtually any environmental violation can
be prosecuted criminally, if an Assistant U.S. Attorney so
37
chooses.
A.

The Mens Rea of Environmental Crimes Today
1.

Knowledge
a. The federal environmental statutes

For many criminal acts, including white collar crimes such as
fraud and embezzlement, a defendant must be shown to have acted with the specific intent to violate the law. 38 By contrast, most
36. See Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come... and It is Hard Time, 20 ENVrL. L. REP.
10096 (March 1990).
37. See, e.g., Kevin A. Gaynor, A System Out of Control, 7 ENVrL. FORUM 28
(May/June 1990).
38. "A person acts with specific intent when his conscious objective is to
cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense." 22
CJ.S. 2D § 33, p. 38 (citing People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1985);
State v Kohler, 434 So.2d 1110 (La. App. 1983); State v. Soft, 329 N.W.2d 128
(S.D. 1983)).
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federal environmental statutes only require the defendant to have
"knowingly" performed an illegal act.3 9 Although not generally
defined by statute, "knowingly," in the environmental context,
has been judicially determined not to require knowledge that one
is violating the law, but merely requires an awareness of one's act.
This deviation from general criminal law emanates from the history of "public welfare statutes" and the continuing line of cases
which hold that neither knowledge of the law nor a specific intent
to violate the law is required to convict a person of a criminal
offense. This section will discuss the degree of knowledge which
must be shown to convict a defendant charged with an environmental crime, in light of existing precedent in the "public welfare" realm.
b. Judicial decisions
Cases involving criminal penalties under environmental statutes have typically centered on three inquires with respect to the
degree of knowledge required:
(1)' whether knowledge of the law or regulation is required;
(2) whether knowledge of the permit status of the activity is
required; and
39. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.

§ 136(l)(b)(1) & (2) (1988) ("[alny registrant, applicant for a registration or, any
producer who knowingly violates.., any commercial applicator of a restricted use
pesticide, or any other person.., who distributes or sells pesticides or devices,
who knowingly violates ...[a]ny private applicator or other person ... who knowingly violates ..."); Endangered Species Act, 16 § 1540(b) (" . .. knowingly violates..."); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) & (e)
(1982 and Supp. 1986) (l)(d) "knowingly transports or causes to be transported
any hazardous waste ... to a facility which does not have a permit ... knowingly
treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste ...without a permit ...or in
knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit ...or
of any applicable interim status regulating or standards.., knowingly omits material information or makes any false material statement ... knowingly generates,
stores, treats, transports, disposes of exports, or otherwise handles any hazardous waste or any used oil ...and who knowingly destroys ... documents required
to be maintained . . .knowingly transports without a manifest . . .knowingly exports a hazardous waste . . . without the consent of the receiving country...
knowingly stores, treats, transports, or causes to be transported, disposes of ...in
knowing violation of any material condition... of a permit.., or of any applicable regulations or standards...", (e) "... Any person who knowingly transports,
treats, stores, disposes of, or exposes any hazardous waste ...who knows at the
time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury .. ."); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1983 and Supp.
1991) (". . . knowingly violates any requirement or prohibition of an applicable
implementation plan ...knowingly makes any false statement... knowingly fails to
pay a fee ... knowingly releases into the ambient air any hazardous air pollutant
). ..
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(3) whether knowledge of the underlying material facts are
required.
(1) Knowledge of the law
The case law on the first issue, the violator's knowledge of
the law which prohibits his conduct, establishes that ignorance of
the law is no defense to an environmental enforcement action.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of ignorance of the law
in a number of "public welfare" cases before the issue was addressed in the environmental context. The result was the creation of two lines of precedent. In United States v. Freed,40 the
defendant was convicted of illegally possessing hand grenades
that were not properly registered pursuant to the National Firearms Act. The Court held that the prosecutor was not required to
prove as an element of the offense the defendant's knowledge
that the grenades needed to be registered. 4 1 The Court reasoned
that an individual in possession of grenades should not be surprised that registration of the devices was required. 42 In United
States v. InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.,43 the defendant was
charged with "knowingly" violating an Interstate Commerce
Commission regulation mandating that corrosive liquids be identified in the shipping papers. The appellee claimed that knowledge of the regulation was a prerequisite to the commission of a
"knowing" violation. 4 4 The Court disagreed, holding that use of
the word "knowingly" in the statute required only general knowledge that the materials being shipped were dangerous. 4 5 The
46
Court further held that ignorance of the law was no excuse.
Moreover, as in Freed, persons handling hazardous materials are
presumed to know that the activity is heavily regulated. The
Court indicated: "But where, as here ... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation. '4 7
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
(1952).

401 U.S. 601 (1971).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 609.
402 U.S. 558 (1971).
Id. at 560.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 565; see also Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
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The Supreme Court adopted a different standard in Liparota
v. United States.48 In that case, the statute in question provided
criminal penalties for anyone who "knowingly uses, transfers, acquires or possesses" food stamps or authorization cards in an unauthorized manner. The Court held that knowledge of the
illegality was required, distinguishing the statutes at issue in Freed
and InternationalMinerals from the food stamp statute, stating that
the proscribed conduct was not "a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation
'49
and may seriously threaten the community's health and safety."
The courts rendering the earliest interpretations of environmental criminal statutes were thus faced with two divergent lines
of authority regarding knowledge under public welfare statutes.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. ,50 the government prosecuted the defendant corporation, a foreman, and a service manager of the trucking department for the unlawful disposal of
hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA). The trial court had specifically concluded that the
government was not required to prove that defendants knew they
were acting in violation of the law. The Third Circuit reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the case, holding that the word
" 'knowingly' applies to all elements of the offense." 5' The court
made clear, however, that with respect to the defendants' knowledge of the law "the government need only prove knowledge of
the actions taken and not the statute forbidding them." 52 Thus,
the knowledge required under RCRA is general knowledge of
53
one's conduct, rather than specific knowledge of illegal conduct.
In United States v. Hayes International Corp.,54 the defendants
argued that the Liparota rationale should apply and the government must prove the defendants' specific knowledge that their actions violated RCRA section 6928(d)(1). The court rejected the
defendants' argument that they did not commit a "knowing" violation because they misunderstood the regulations, holding that
48. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
49. Id. at 433; see also Brian E. Concannon, Jr., Comment, Criminal Sanctions
for Environmental Crimes and the Knowledge Requirement: United States v. Hayes International, 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 535 (1988)
[hereinafter "Criminal Sanctions"].
50. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Angel v. United States,
469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
51. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
52. Id. at 669.
53. Id.
54. 786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986).
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knowledge of illegality of the acts committed is not an element of
the offense. 55
56
Two years later, the same court in United States v. Greer,
under a different provision of RCRA section 6928(d) (2) (A), held
that the owner of a waste recycling and transportation business
could be found to have "knowingly" violated the hazardous waste
laws regardless of his knowledge of those laws. The evidence in
the trial court had shown that Greer ordered the disposal of waste
knowing that the waste had the potential to be harmful.5 7 The
Eleventh Circuit found such evidence to be enough to sustain the
58
conviction.
In United States v. Dee, 59 a chemical engineer and his superiors
were convicted of "knowingly" violating RCRA regulations regarding procedures for management and disposal of solid and
hazardous waste materials. On appeal, the defendants claimed
that there was insufficient evidence to show that they knew violations of RCRA were crimes, and also that they were unaware that
the chemicals they managed were hazardous waste. 60 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the convictions, stating that the government was
not required to prove either that the defendants knew violations
of RCRA were crimes, or knew that there were regulations listing
61
and identifying the chemical wastes as RCRA hazardous wastes.
It is notable that Johnson & Towers, Greer, Hayes and Dee dealt
with the handling of hazardous wastes under RCRA. These cases
demonstrate that, where hazardous wastes are concerned, the
courts seem to follow the Freed/InternationalMinerals line of precedent, which dispenses with knowledge of the law as an element of
the crime. There are other environmental criminal statutes, however, which do not fall squarely into the category of public health
regulations, but rather, seek to promote the policy of preserving
the environment. For example, the Clean Water Act proscribes
62
the dredging and filling of protected wetlands without a permit.
Such conduct is less obviously "subject to stringent public regula55. Id. at 1503; see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713,
720-21 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829
(1983) (general willfulness suffices to sustain a conviction under the Clean
Water Act; knowledge of the law is not required).
56. 850 F.2d 1447 (11 th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1451-52.
58. Id. at 1452.
59. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1307 (1991).
60. Id. at 745.
61. Id. at 745.
62. See 33 U.S.C §§ 1319(c)(2) and 1344.
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tion" than is the transportation of hazardous materials, the release of which could severely affect public health. The argument
that Liparota applies to such violations may therefore still be a viable one.
(2) Knowledge of the permit status
The circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether knowledge of the permit status must be demonstrated in order to convict a defendant of an environmental criminal violation. In
Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit held that the government must
prove the defendant knew the facility lacked a permit, but that
such knowledge may be inferred from conduct. 6 3 In Hayes, the
Eleventh Circuit clarified the rule that such knowledge may be
proved by inference, holding that "in this regulatory context a
defendant acts knowingly if he willfully fails to determine the permit status of the facility." 64
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the position that
knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of the
offense defined by RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A). In United States v.
Hoflin,65 the defendant was charged with violating the same
RCRA provision at issue in Johnson & Towers. Relying on that decision, he argued that the government was required to prove his
knowledge that the plant where he had ordered paint cans to be
disposed was not permitted. 66 The government contended that
under Johnson & Towers, knowledge should be inferred. 6 7 The
court declined to adopt or to distinguish the Third Circuit's ruling in Johnson & Towers, instead dispensing with knowledge of the
68
permit status as an element of the offense.
(3) Knowledge of underlying materialfacts
(i) In general
In InternationalMinerals, the Court held that the government
must prove the defendant's knowledge that the material being
shipped was hazardous, stating that "[a] person thinking in good
faith that he was shipping distilled water when in fact he was ship63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504.
880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990).
Id. at 1037.
Id.
Id. at 1038.
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ping some dangerous acid would not be covered" 6 9 by the regulation under which the defendant was prosecuted. Thus, even in
cases involving public welfare statutes, the government must
prove the defendant's knowledge of certain underlying material
70
facts to obtain a conviction.
In Hayes, the defendants raised a "good faith" mistake of fact
defense, arguing that they believed the paint waste which they
transported was being recycled. 7' Although the court found
there was "sufficient evidence for the jury to have rejected the
defense of mistake of fact," 7 2 it recognized the existence of such a
defense and gave some indication of its elements. 73 The court
noted that, once the defense is raised, the defendant bears the
burden of persuasion; the government is "not required to disprove the [defendant's] mistake of fact defense." 74 Moreover, the
good faith defense may be rebutted by facts from which knowl75
edge may be inferred.
(ii) Objective versus subjective standard
The government often tries to water down the knowledge
standard by attempting to impose, through jury instructions, an
objective standard on the mens rea requirement, that is, to hold the
defendant liable for factual knowledge she should have had,
rather than only for that which she actually possessed. 76 However, it has been generally held that when a statute penalizes an
act performed "knowingly" there must be actual knowledge of the
circumstances. 77 Under this line of cases, the government should
not be able to argue that a person should have known, for exam69. InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64.
70. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668; Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1505; Hoflin, 880
F.2d at 1039.
71. Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1505.
72. Id. at 1506.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See United States v. Ellen, 90-0215 D.Md.,Jury Instruction No. 33B. It
should be noted that jury instructions are the critical document setting forth the
government's interpretation of what constitutes the crime at issue. Yet, because
there is no centralized review of environmental criminal cases there is no assurance that a particular instruction sought by an Assistant United States Attorney
comports with legal positions advocated by EPA or Main Justice in other cases.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bodden, No. 90-5227, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
8480 (4th Cir., Apr. 25, 1991); United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799, 803 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Cox, 696 F.2d 1294, 1297 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 827 (1983).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

17

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 1

18

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. III: p. I

pie, that the waste was hazardous, she should only be held liable if
her subjective belief was that the waste was hazardous.
The government has also made attempts under the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine to hold corporate officers liable
for any knowledge which might be imputed to the officer even
78
though he lacked actual or inferred knowledge of the crime.
However, the current application of the doctrine indicates that
the officer's position in the company merely raises the inference
that he possessed the requisite knowledge. In United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. ,79 the defendants were charged
with, and later convicted of, knowingly transporting contaminated
soil to an unpermitted facility under RCRA. The court instructed
the jury as follows on the responsible corporate officer doctrine:
When an individual Defendant is also a corporate officer,
the Government may prove that individual's knowledge
in either of two ways. The first way is to demonstrate
that the Defendant had actual knowledge of the act in
question. The second way is to establish that the defendant was what is called a responsible officer of the
corporation committing the act. In order to prove that a
person is a responsible corporate officer three things
must be shown.
First, it must be shown that the person is an officer of the
corporation, not merely an employee.
Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility for the activities that are alleged to be illegal.
Simply being an officer or even the president of a corporation is not enough. The Government must prove that
the person had a responsibility to supervise the activities
in question.
And the third requirement is that the officer must have
known or believed that the illegal activity of the type alleged
80
occurred.
On appeal, the defendant corporate president argued that
the court's instruction permitted the jury to ignore the element of
knowledge contained in the criminal provisions of RCRA by instructing it that proof that a defendant was a "responsible corpo78. Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, Toxics L. REP. (BNA)
983, 987-88 (Jan. 9, 1991).
79. 933 F.2d 35 (lst Cir. 1990).
80. Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added).
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rate officer" would satisfy the knowledge requirement. 8 ' The
government tried to argue that the jury instruction given in the
district court was not an objective standard.8 2 The First Circuit
agreed with the defendant and stated:
[K]nowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers, as well as information
provided to those defendants on prior occasions. Further, willful blindness to the facts constituting the offense may be sufficient to establish knowledge.
However, the district court erred by instructing the jury
that proof that a defendant was a responsible corporate
officer, ..

. ,

would suffice to conclusively establish the

element of knowledge expressly required

.... 83

As this language makes clear, the applicability of the responsible corporate officer doctrine is not intended to displace the
mens rea requirement of the statute under which an individual is
charged.8 4 If the statute requires that the misconduct or omission
be "knowing," the government must still prove the defendant's
knowledge. The fact that a corporate officer had responsibility to
supervise the activities in question should simply raise the inference of guilty knowledge.
In sum, while generally knowledge of one's act is required,
and knowledge of one's permit status is often required. As the
courts have interpreted the environmental statutes, knowledge of
the law is generally not required to sustain a criminal conviction.
(iii) Legislative history
While the courts have interpreted the environmental statutes
to require minimal mens rea, the legislative history of the criminal
provisions did not provide the courts with much assistance in this
area. With little exception, Congress was silent on this issue. For
example, in neither the new Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, nor generally in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, did Congress ever address the concepts of specific versus general intent and
the ramifications of each. In fact, in RCRA, in its Hazardous
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 50.
Id.at 51.
Id.at 55.
MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 55.
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Waste Amendment of 1984, Congress freely acknowledges that it
did not seek to define the culpability standard it imposed in its
general criminal penalty section.8 5
In one of the few instances where Congress did discuss the
criminal provisions of any environmental statute, it stated that its
purpose in amending the provision was to increase criminal conduct from a low penalty crime (misdemeanor) to higher one (felony) - to be consistent with other federal environmental
statutes, thereby increasing the penalty without review or regard
for the level of culpability.8 6 Congressional failure to adequately
explain the state of mind required for a criminal act permits the
courts great leeway in their interpretation at a time when environmental criminal convictions are attracting much publicity.
Even where there was some Congressional intent to define
the necessary level of culpability, the courts have not chosen to
recognize it. Under RCRA (the Act in which "knowingly" has
been most frequently interpreted and found not to require scienter with respect to knowledge of the law) at least a part of the
legislative history, however unwittingly, 8 7 indicates that Congress
intended that a purposeful and specific intent to violate the law is
a8
necessary.
In reality, even with some minor Congressional intent to create specific intent crimes evident, Congress has not provided the
courts with ammunition to deviate from the backdrop of the public welfare cases, or reject the public pressure to convict alleged
violators of environmental laws.
Even under the statutes with seemingly higher levels of cul85. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1444,
96th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028, 5038. But see H.R.
REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028,
5038-5039 ("Subsection (f)(1)[knowing endangerment] defines "knowing" for
the purposes of the endangerment offense . . . The ultimate issue for the jury
will be whether the defendant ... was actually aware or actually believed that his
conduct would create the charges described... ").
86. Clean Air Act Amendments, S. REP. No. 101-228, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
6, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3745-746.
87. See supra, note 85.
88. Conservation and Recovery Act, H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6319, 6321 ("[t]he criminal [versus the civil]
penalties are often more appropriate where there is a clear knowing disregard
for the law. In practice, criminal sanctions are sought in cases of blatant or repeated acts which cause significant harm to the environment or involve fraud
upon the Government." Agency Comment, Executive Office of the President,
Office of Management and Budget, Comment of Hon. Fred B. Rooney, Chairman, Subcommittee of Transportation and Commerce). Neither similar nor
contradictory language ever made it to the conference reports.
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pability, (for example, the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 8 9 and the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA), 90 ) Congress still failed to alleviate confusion. In
EPCRA, Congress declared:
Any person who knowingly and willfully fails to provide notice in accordance with Section [§ 11004 of this title]
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $25,000
or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both (or
in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more
than five years, or both). 9 1
And, in TSCA, the criminal provision reads:
Any person who knowingly or willfully violates any provision of section 2614 of this title, shall, in addition to or
in lieu of any civil penalty which may be imposed under
subsection (a) of this section for such violation, be subject, upon conviction, to a fine of not more than $25,000
for each day of violation, or to imprisonment for not
92
more than one year, or both.
Both EPCRA and TSCA appear to have higher levels of culpability than do the other statutes which only have a "knowing" standard. However, the "or" in knowingly or willfully and the "and" in
knowingly and willfully still confuses the issue of whether criminal
conduct under those acts requires specific or general intent. Congress has chosen not to explain its intent in either of these
93
statutes.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001-11050 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
90. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-71 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11045(b)(4) (emphasis added). The use of the term willfully typically connotes specific intent. See Cheek, infra note 113, (Supreme Court
tax case which discusses this issue).
92. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2615(b).
93. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, H.R.
REP. No. 962, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 308-309, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276,
3401-02 ("[the criminal provision] established.., penalties for any person who
knowingly fails to provide notice in accordance with Section 304. Such criminal
penalties, of course, would not be mandatory should EPA determine that a violation has occurred, and standard prosecutorial discretion would apply."); Toxic
Substances and Control Act, S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4516 ("[plrovides criminal penalties of up to $25,000
per day in addition to or in lieu of a civil penalty, for any person who knowingly
(having actual knowledge) or willfully violates this act."), Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. REP. No. 1679, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4539, 4577 (the Senate Bill "[p]rovides for criminal
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Other Standards

The above discussion summarizes the "knowledge" culpability standard as it is currently interpreted. Although there are
some federal environmental statutes which have higher standards
of mens rea, this does not appear to be the trend, as the most recent federal statutory amendments, including the 1991 amendment to the Clean Air Act, 9 4 have not increased the level of mens
rea required. Additionally, two of the recently enacted statutory
amendments, the Clean Air Act Amendments and the amendment
to the Clean Water Act, 95 include negligent levels of culpability in
their criminal provisions, and another, the Endangered Species
Act, actually decreased the culpability level in its criminal provisions from willful to knowing. 9 6
Originally, the Clean Water Act (CWA) proscribed negligent
or willful conduct. 9 7 United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. ,98 involved

the first criminal prosecution of corporate officers for violations
of the CWA. In Frezzo Brothers, the defendants were convicted of
willfully and negligently discharging pollutants associated with
their mushroom farming business into the navigable waters of the
United States without a permit. 9 9 The court held that the prosecution, in order to support a conviction for criminal negligence,
needed only to establish that "the water pollution abatement facilities were negligently maintained by the Frezzos and were insufficient to prevent discharges of the wastes."' 0 0
In United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products,'0 ' the govpenalties of up to $25,000 per day or up to one year's imprisonment, or both,
per violation, for any person who knowingly or willfully violates this Act.") conference substitute, 4578 ("Criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who
'knowingly or willfully' violate .
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c).

95. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319 & 1321.
96. Endangered Species Act, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9493-94) (Congress changed standard in
1978 from "willful" to "knowing," indicating at the time that knowledge of the
law is not meant to be an element of the crime). See also United States v.
Nguygen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1990) (court acknowledged and followed legislative history and held that knowledge of the law is not intended to
be element of crime).
97. Prior to being amended in 1987, § 1319(c)(1) read: any person who
willfully or negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 or 1318 of this
title .

.

. shall be punished by fine .

.

. or by imprisonment ....

Id.

98. 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979),

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).

99. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1124.
100. Id. at 1129.
101. 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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ernment again prosecuted corporate officers of a mushroom
farming business. The defendants' claimed that the indictments
charging them with willfully and negligently discharging pollutants were duplicitous. The court responded: "the mens rea required for negligent conduct and that required for willful conduct
cannot be viewed as entirely distinct. It is well settled that intentional conduct may be imputed to a tortfeasor because of grossly
02
negligent conduct."
This language raises the possibility that the negligence standard contemplated under the CWA is "gross" or "willful." The
03
language contained in the proposed Environmental Crimes Act'
supports this view. The proposed bill would create a new misdemeanor offense of negligently endangering life or causing an environmental catastrophe. In contrast to the CWA, which is silent
as to the meaning of the term "negligence," the bill defines negligence as follows: "A person is negligent if he or she is unaware of
a risk so severe that the lack of awareness is a gross deviation
from a reasonable person's standard of care."' 1 4 The 1987
amendments to section 1319(c) of the CWA separated "negligent" offenses, which are misdemeanors, from "willful" ones,
which are felonies. The language of the statute indicates that
criminal penalties can indeed be imposed under the CWA for simple negligence. Additionally, prosecutors have sought and ob10 5
tained jury instructions for negligence under the CWA.
3.

Culpability Under State Laws

With much of the criminal prosecutions occurring at the state
level, the culpability levels in the state statutory schemes should
also be of concern. Indeed a decreased level of mens rea is also
evident in the state environmental laws. Although a few states
102. Id. at 857.
103. See H.R. 3641, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (1989).

104. Id.
105. In Clean Water Act cases, the government has requested the following
jury instruction:
The term "negligence" means failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is the care which a reasonably careful person would use under
similar circumstances. Negligence may consist of doing something that
a reasonably careful person would not do under similar circumstances
or failing to do something that a reasonable person [sic] would do
under similar circumstances.
See United States v. Schwitters, No. CR86-129S (W.D. Wash. 1986) (plaintiff's requested instruction #18). See also supra, note 78, at 992-993; United
States v. Dee, Crim. No. HAR-88-0211, D.Md., aff'd 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.
1990).
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have imposed higher mens rea requirements in at least some criminal provisions (i.e., willful or intentional), 10 6 many states have
adopted statutes which require similar or even less culpability
than their federal counterparts - some requiring as little as reckless or negligent conduct. Some states even impose a strict liability standard. 10 7 Overall, there have been few judicial decisions
106. See, e.g., Connecticut, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
107. SeeJamesJ. McElfish, Jr., State Hazardous Waste Crimes 17 ENVT.. L. REP.
10465, 10466 (1987) (thorough analysis of requisite state of mind for state hazardous waste crimes) [hereinafter McElfish, Waste Crimes]. See also the following
hazardous waste statutes: Alabama (Ala. Code § 22-30-19(e) (1990)); Alaska
(ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.790, 46.03.800, 46.03.810 (1991)); Arizona (ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN § 49-925 (1988)), Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-7-204,
8-7-205 (Michie 1987)); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25186.5, 25189.5, 25191, 25195, 25343, 25515, 25515.1, 25541 (West 1987
& Supp. 1992)), (CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13261, 13265, 13268, 13387 (West
1987 & Supp. 1992)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-106, 18-13-112,
25-15-211, 25-15-310, 29-22-101, 29-22-108 (1986)); Connecticut (CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-131a (West 1985 & Supp. 1992)); Delaware (DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6013, 6309(f)-(h) (1974 & Supp. 1990)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-711(c) (1988)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.727(3)(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1992)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 12-882 (Michie 1989)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 342-11(d) (1985 & Supp.
1990)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 39-4415 (1990)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111 1/2 para. 1044(a)-(e) (Smith Hurd 1990)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 13-7-13-1, 13,7-13-3, 13-7-13-4 (West 1991)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 455B.417 (West 1991)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3441 (1964 & Supp.
1991)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.99-010 (Michie 1991)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2025, 30:2183, 30:2025F, 30:2183G (West
1989)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 1319-T (1989)); Maryland (MD.
HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-209, 7-249, 7-252, 7-265, 7-267 (1989));
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 21C § 10 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992));
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.548 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992));
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.071(2)(a) (West 1987)); Missouri (MO.
REV. STAT. § 260.425.3 (1990)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-418
(1991)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-4508(i), 81-1512 (1990)); ADMIN.
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 459.590 (Michie 1990)); New Hampshire
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-A:11, 147-A:16 (1990)); New Jersey (N.J. PENAL CODE tit. 26, 17-2, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-9(g)-(i) (West 1991)); New
Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-1-10, 74-4-11, 74-4-13.B (Michie 1976 &
Supp. 1991)); New York (N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 71-0913, 71-2705,
71-2707, 71-2709-2715, 71-2717, 71-2719, 71-2721, 71-2723 (McKinneys 1985
& Supp. 1991)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-25 (1983 & Supp.
1991)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.99 (Anderson 1991));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-2011 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991));
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 466.995 (1991)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 6018.606 (Purdon's 1975 & Supp. 1991)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-19.1-12 (1989)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-140
(Law Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1990)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 34A-11-21 (1987 & Supp. 1991)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46114 (1987)); Texas (TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 § 8(b) (West
1988)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14-13(2) (1991)); Vermont (VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6612 (1984 & Supp. 1991)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 10-310
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.99.050, 70.105.090 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992)); West Virginia (W. VA.
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interpreting such state statutes.
B.

The Hazards of a Reduced Culpability Level
1.

PracticalApplication

With both federal and state enforcement systems lowering
the standards for showing culpability, the public should be concerned. No longer are criminal prosecutions limited to the
"midnight dumpers." Instead, the criminal remedy has become a
pivotal weapon against all segments of the regulated community.
Often, what was previously considered administrative or regulatory can now be criminal.' 0 8 Not only is "corporate america"
subject to the laws, but so are all businesses, including the neighborhood auto repair shop and the local dry cleaner. Any business
whose water goes into the sewer system is subject to the provisions of the CWA. Any business which produces more than a de
minimis volume of a waste, even nonhazardous waste, is subject to
the RCRA.
It is not just businesses that are subject to criminal prosecution, but individuals employed by businesses as well. Under the
current system, everyone must adhere to the environmental laws
even if they are not cognizant of how to comply. A foreman, unaware of strict compliance requirements, can wind up behind bars
for failure to seek out this information, either because the knowledge of law is not an element of the violation or because of the
concept of willful blindness.10 9 Company presidents, completely
unfamiliar with environmental regulations, can be liable under
the responsible corporate officer doctrine, a theory which raises
the inference of guilty knowledge. 10
Also subject to the criminal environmental provisions of the
federal statutes is the average citizen outside of his employment.
For instance, the landowner who builds vacation property can be
held criminally liable under section 404 of the CWA for accidental
CODE § 20-5E-15 (1989)); Wisconsin (WISC. STAT. ANN. § 144.74(2) (West
1989)); Wyoming (WYO. STAT. § 35-11-901(j) & (k) (1977 & Supp. 1991)).
108. McElfish, Waste Crimes, supra note 107 at 10466.
109. Under the concept of willful blindness, a defendant can be found to
have had knowledge where he has deliberately avoided discovery facts that
would show environmental violations. See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1505 (court held
that officer's willful failure to determine the permit status of a facility to which
hazardous waste was transferred satisfies the requirement of knowledge under
RCRA). But see United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096
(2d Cir. 1985)(court reversed conviction under TSCA; defendant's conduct was
merely reckless).
110. See MacDonald & Watson, supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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development on wetlands property. Similarly, farmers can become criminal violators for disposing of pesticides.
The criminal provisions of the statutes are written as if compliance was easy to comprehend and achieve by those to whom it
applies. In fact, the knowledge assumed by the government in
these cases is very complex and hardly intuitive. As stated earlier,
there are over 10,000 pages of federal environmental regulations,
many of which are overwhelmingly complex and are continually
changing. Due to the relatively recent nature of the statutes and
regulations, many of these provisions have not yet been interpreted or subject to differing interpretations. Determining, for
example, what is a solid waste under RCRA can be a mind-bending, counter-intuitive leap into unreality."' How can we require
companies, let alone individuals, to comply with this volume of
material which has yet to be fully interpreted, and then hold them
criminally liable for failure to do so? Indeed, contrary to what
Congressperson Rooney stated in the legislative history of the
RCRA'12, many of the new environmental "criminals" are first
time offenders. Growing environmental awareness should not
grant Congress carte blanche to impose sweeping criminal laws
with little or no discussion of the standard of intent under those
laws and the ramifications of violations. Clarifying statutory requirements is particularly important because criminal environmental provisions could potentially affect virtually every business
and individual in this country.
Where the law is so complex that it becomes too difficult to
comprehend by the average citizen, Congress should compensate, as it has in the tax area, by insisting that only defendants
acting with specific intent be criminally convicted. This concept
has been highlighted by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Cheek." 3 In Cheek, the defendant believed that he
was not required to file a tax return under the scope of the tax
laws. The Court held that a good-faith misunderstanding of the
law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law negates
willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.' 14 In other words, the defendant
must have voluntarily intended to violate a known legal duty.' '5
111. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.10 & 261.1.

112.
113.
114.
115.

See supra, note 87.
111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 611.
Id. at 610.
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If the defendant did not know of the law or honestly did not believe he was violating the law, he could not be held liable for willful violation. 1 6 Although there is disparity in the courts as to
whether willfulness requires general or specific intent, several
courts have also held that specific intent is required." 17
As stated in Cheek:
[T]he proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know
and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations
imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common law presumption by
making specific intent to violate the law an element of
certain federal offenses. This .
is largely due to the
complexity of the tax laws." 8
The environmental laws are more complex than the tax laws.
Indeed, their recent introduction to society, as compared to the
tax laws, makes the case even more compelling.
2.

A ConstitutionalArgument

Given that the present environmental laws are complex, that
they have such broad applicability, and that the penalties for violation can be substantial, a constitutional dilemma associated with
a reduced level of culpability arises. To convict a defendant of a
serious felony without a high degree of mens rea may be a violation
of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. 1 9 In fact, the
116. Id. at 611.
117. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 242, dealing with violations of civil rights, as requiring specific intent in
a federal criminal prosecution of local law enforcement officers who arrested a
black for a state offense and then wrongfully beat him to death); United States v.
Sehnal, 930 F.2d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 300 (1991)
(jury instruction which read "[ain act is done willfully if done voluntarily and
intentionally with the purpose of violating a known legal duty" is effectively the
same as one which would state that the defendant must have had a specific intent
to do something the law forbids (citing United States v. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. 604
(1991)); United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 501-02 (2d. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 67 (1991) (trier of fact may properly consider educational background and expertise of defendant in order to establish whether he had the subjective belief that his conduct was illegal (citing United States v. Cheek, 111 S. Ct.
604 (1991)); United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991)
(recognizing divergent line of cases but finding for purposes of criminal copyright infringement that willful requires specific intent (citing United States v.
Cheek, I llS. Ct. 604 (1991)).
118. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609.
119. It is a deeply-rooted notion in American law that crime requires the
concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand. The existence of
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Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez has indicated that
one of the hallmarks distinguishing a criminal from a civil penalty
is that the imposition of a criminal penalty requires a finding of
scienter.' 20 However, due to judicial decision, the intended
2
bright line distinction has been obfuscated.' '
In fact, one could argue that there should be a direct relationship between the culpability level of a crime and the penalty
assessed. This theory is supported by the case law regarding imposition of penalties for strict liability offenses. While strict liability offenses have been found to be acceptable when the
punishment is a civil penalty, they are "generally disfavored" by
the Supreme Court of the United States in which criminal penalties may be imposed.' 2 2 When strict liability offenses have been
imposed criminally, the criminal penalty was so minor it was more
akin to a civil penalty. In United States v. Wulff,12 3 the Court, relying on United States v. Holdridge,124 concluded that strict liability
would violate the due process clause unless the penalty attached
to a criminal conviction was relatively small and the conviction
would not "gravely besmirch" the defendant's reputation. 2 5 Following this rationale, it can be argued that the higher the penalty,
the more mens rea that should be required to commit the criminal
act.'

26

By contrast, due to statutory language and subsequent judia mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of AngloAmerican criminal jurisprudence." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500
(1951) (quoted in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)).
120. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). If a
criminal penalty is sought, all of the. constitutional protections required as part
of a crimial proceeding are called into play. Id.
121. See generally supra, notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
122. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438.
123. 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Engler v. United
States, 487 U.S. 1019 (1987).
124. 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub noma., Engler v. United
States, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987).
125. See United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied sub nom., Engler v. United States, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987) ("[c]ertainly, if
Congress attempted to define a malum prohibitum offense that placed an onerous
stigma on an offender's reputation and that carried a severe penalty, the
[C]onstitution would be offended...").
126. In the few other cases that have found strict liability to be acceptable
for imposition of a criminal violation, generally, the theory has been that it is an
acceptable method of allocating liability where the balance weighs against those
with the opportunity of informing themselves. In United States v. Dotterweich,
the Supreme Court stated:
Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon
those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the
existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before
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cial interpretation, federal environmental laws no longer have
culpability distinctions between civil and criminal offenses. Nor
do they generally require a high level of culpability for criminal
offenses. These factors taken together potentially offend a defendant's due process rights.
IV.

RECTIFYING THE SITUATION

Three possible ways exist to rectify the current mens rea situation. First, as discussed in Section I, there is no government-wide
procedure for determining when conduct becomes criminally
prosecutable. The Department of Justice could institute a procedure similar to that in effect in the civil arena, which would cover
both the Environment and National Resource Division, as well as
the United States Attorneys' offices. This policy should implement required standard procedures for deciding what conduct is
civilly, administratively or criminally prosecutable. Coupled with
centralized review, it should assure far greater consistency in the
selection of cases to be prosecuted criminally.
Second, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Environment and Natural Resources Division could mandate that no environmental criminal cases will be
brought unless the higher standard of specific intent is met by the
actions of potential targets of an environmental criminal investigation.' 2 7 Targets not meeting this elevated standard would be
handled in the civil or administrative area. This would create a
bright line between criminal environmental enforcement on one
hand, and civil and administrative on the other. The cloud that
currently hangs over the practice of any environmental violation
being criminally enforced would be removed. At the same time,
the government's limited criminal prosecutorial resources could
be focused on the truly bad actors; those that are engaging in an
act that is an environmental violation and understand, or should
understand, that the act in question violates the law. Many of the
cases the government currently brings would be unaffected since
presumably prosecutors could make this higher showing. However, that portion of the government's docket where knowledge is
sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard in the innocent public who are wholly helpless.
320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943). However, as discussed above, this argument can not
withstand scrutiny in the current environmental climate given the broad area
over which, and persons over whom, the environmental laws span.
127. This mandate would presumably take the form of a directive in the
U.S. Attorney's Manual.
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questionable, given the enormous complexity of the regulatory
scheme involved, would be treated civilly or administratively. 28
Third, Congress could amend the current federal environmental statutes and increase the culpability levels for criminal
conduct to "willful," creating specific intent crimes. Alternatively, Congress could specifically declare that "knowingly" denotes knowledge of the applicable law. This can be accomplished
by either amending each individual environmental statute or
through the passage of an omnibus statute. In this way, Congress
could send a clear message to law enforcement agencies and the
judiciary that the level of culpability needs to be substantial
before steps are taken towards criminal conviction. As more and
more federal environmental laws will be passed over the next few
decades, Congress should take heed of how its laws have been
interpreted and to whom they have been applied. With this new
knowledge, Congress can amend current statutory law and prepare for the certain new wave of environmental regulation.
Any of these methods, particularly the last two, would go a
long way to make criminal prosecutions uniform throughout the
country; regardless of which government office initiates the
investigation.
V.

BENEFITS

Modification to the current environmental laws and to their
enforcement provides several benefits. It would send clear signals to the public as to what is, and what is not, criminal conduct.
In addition, it would help focus government criminal resources
on only the worst offenders, leaving other violators for the civil or
administrative process. Strict environmental laws are necessary.
No one can deny the need for increased enforcement in this area.
However, environmental laws should be uniformly enforced using a bright line established to delineate criminal conduct from
128. According to Joseph G. Block, formerly Chief of the Environmental
Crimes Section in the Environmental and Natural Resources Division of the Department ofJustice, currently a partner at the law firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, Washington, D.C., the specific intent standard would not hurt the
government's efforts since its stated focus is supposedly on cases where the defendants had full knowledge of the law and intentionally avoided it.
Although there is a general intent standard for many of these violations, we
were looking to prosecute egregious situations where the defendants knew what
the regulations were, knew how to follow them and intentionally decided to violate them. A number of the prosecutions would involve situations where defendants were actively trying to hide non-compliance by lying on discharge
monitoring reports and other reports required by the government.
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persons who failed to comply with complex laws and regulations
of which they were unaware. This is a nation of laws. The critical
decision to prosecute a member of this society for criminal violations should be made in a predictable fashion that allows members of the public to pattern their conduct to avoid criminal
liability, and not on the whim of an Assistant U.S. Attorney, no
matter how principled or well intentioned she is.
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